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SUDFNT NOTES
or devise of property to a devisee or legatee, subsequent precatory
words will not be construed to show an intent to creat a trust, as this
would be inconsistent and repugnant to the prior expression of the
testator. Bogert, Trusts, p. 50; and Perry, Trusts, See. 115. This rule
was recognized and followed in two recent Kentucky cases. Gross v.
Smart, 189 Ky. 338, 224 S. W. 871 (1920); and Igo v. Irvine, supra.
In the latter case the testator devised lands to his son absolutely, and
by a subsequent provision, he requested all of his children, if they
should die without issue, to will the property received from his estate,
to the testator's surviving children or the issue of those dead. This
subsequent provision was held insufficient to create a trust, and thus
limit the fee simple title previously devised. This rule was also
adopted and followed in the case of Hess v. Sing er, 114 Mass. 56
(1873).
Therefore in conclusion the writer submits that by virtue of this
first provision in the will granting his property to his wife absolutely, the testator created a fee simple interest in the property in
his wife, which interest cannot properly be said to be in any way
affected or changed by the subsequent use of precatory words in the
Instrument.
W. R. Joxqns.

TonTs-LmiEL PEP S.
Conditions obtaining in the late prohibition era gave rise to many
a good newspaper yarn. But out of such conditions also flowered
many a well founded suit in libel. A typical case is the late one of
Courier-JournalCo. v. Noble, 251 Ky. 527 (1933).
The plaintiff, the owner and operator of a rooming house, sued
the paper because of a published news dispatch which stated that A
was killed "during a liquor raid on the home of Mrs. Lizzie Noble."
The officers had entered Mrs. Noble's home, not for the purpose
of searching it for liquor, but for the purpose of arresting some men
who had entered it. A trial before a jury resulted in a verdict and
judgment of $3,100 for the plaintiff. The defendant appealed on the
ground "that an innuendo cannot extend the words beyond their
natural import, and that the words, 'during a liquor raid,' do not
necessarily mean that the owner of the house raided was an unlawful
dealer in whiskey, and that a person may be an unlawful possessor of
liquor and still not be 'an unlawful dealer in whiskey.' ". Held, the
words carried with them the imputation that the plaintiff was violating the Prohibition Act in her home, and, being not only such as to
injure her in her reputation and expose her to shame and disgrace,
but such as to prejudice her in her business, they are libelous per se,
and therefore susceptible to the meaning given them by the innuendo.
The language of the court is confusing. A publication cannot be
libelous per se, and yet need an innuendo with which to explain the
meaning of the words used. If the words in question are actionable
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per se, no innuendo is required. But where the words used are not
libelous per se, it is necessary to allege that they were understood in
a libelous sense. This is -thefunction of the innuendo. 17 R. C. L. 396,
Sec. 150. If, then, as we apprehend, the court meant to say that the
innuendo fulfilled any function in this case, such a conclusion must
be rejected as wrong.
The "decision appears otherwise sound. Thus, before its unfortunate reference to the innuendo, the court states that "while
spoken words are slanderous per se only if they impute crime, infectious disease, or unfitness to perform duties of office, or prejudice
one in his profession or trade, or tend to disinherit him, written or
printed publications which are false and tend to injure one in his
reputation or to expose him to public hatred, contempt, scorn, obloquy,
or shame, are libelous per se." Ripley v. Lee, 88 Ky. 603, 11 S. W. 713
(1889); Axton-Pisher Tobacco Co. v. Evening Post Co., 169 Ky. 64,
183 S. W. 269 (1916). The court might well have stopped here. For
the proper conclusion is that the words were actionable per se, and
therefore the innuendo should have been rejected as surplusage. 17
R. C. L. 397, Sec. 151; 37 C. J., Section 332.
The point we have tried to make seems worth stressing when it is
remembered that the jury in the principal case assumed a needless
burden if it attempted to pass upon the truth of the innuendo, namely,
whether the words, "during a liquor raid," meant that the owner of
the house raided was an unlawful dealer in whiskey. It was sufficient
that the words were false, that they were written, and that they
tended to injure the plaintiff in her reputation, or to expose her to
public hatred, contempt, scorn, obloquy, or shame. 17 R. C. I. 398,
Sec. 152.
BYRo1 PUmPEBEy.

